108 research outputs found
RSA Cryptanalysis with Increased Bounds on the Secret Exponent using Less Lattice Dimension
We consider RSA with , , public encryption exponent and private decryption exponent . Boneh and Durfee (Eurocrypt 1999, IEEE-IT 2000) used Coppersmith\u27s method (Journal of Cryptology, 1997) to factorize using when , the {\sf theoretical bound}. Related works have also been presented by Blömer and May (CaLC 2001). However, the {\sf experimental bound} for that has been reached so far is only for 1000 bits (the upper bound on less for higher number of bits). The basic idea relied on LLL algorithm, but the experimental bounds were constrained by large lattice dimensions. In this paper we present
{\sf theoretical results} as well as {\sf experimental evidences} to
{\sf extend the bound of} for which RSA is weak. This requires the
knowledge of a few most significant bits of (alternatively these bits need to be searched exhaustively). We provide experimental results to highlight that the problem can be solved with low lattice dimensions in practice. Our strategy outperforms the existing experimental results by increasing the bounds of . We provide clear evidence that RSA, with of the order of for 1000 bit , can be cryptanalysed in practice from the knowledge of
Study on the effect of toxicity under highly arsenic prone zone in Nadia district of West Bengal in India
The present study was carried out on the basis of status of arsenic in soil, drinking water and plants, blood, urine and faeces of animals at arsenic prone zone. Within the ambit with the environment, the examination of animals was taken into consideration. They were screened and categorised on the degree of As toxicity. For field works animals were randomly selected from arsenic prone zone. The external manifestation indicated a complex syndrome and characteristic signs such as increased heart rate and respiratory rate, red urine, congested mucous membrane, anorexia, absence of ruminal motility, diarrhoea with blood, polyuria and unusual weight loss. The haematobiochemical changes such as low Hb level, decreased level of TEC, TLC and increased level ALT, AST, BUN and creatinine. Increased level of arsenic in urine, blood and faeces than the value of control animals could be the confirmatory indication of arsenic toxicity
A deeper understanding of the XOR count distribution in the context of lightweight cryptography
In this paper, we study the behavior of the XOR count distributions under different bases of finite field. XOR count of a field element is a simplified metric to estimate the hardware implementation cost to compute the finite field multiplication of an element. It is an important criterion in the design of lightweight cryptographic primitives, typically to estimate the efficiency of the diffusion layer in a block cipher. Although several works have been done to find lightweight MDS diffusion matrices, to the best of our knowledge, none has considered finding lightweight diffusion matrices under other bases of finite field apart from the conventional polynomial basis. The main challenge for considering different bases for lightweight diffusion matrix is that the number of bases grows exponentially as the dimension of a finite field increases, causing it to be infeasible to check all possible bases. Through analyzing the XOR count distributions and the relationship between the XOR count distributions under different bases, we find that when all possible bases for a finite field are considered, the collection of the XOR count distribution is invariant to the choice of the irreducible polynomial of the same degree. In addition, we can partition the set of bases into equivalence classes, where the XOR count distribution is invariant in an equivalence class, thus when changing bases within an equivalence class, the XOR count of a diffusion matrix will be the same. This significantly reduces the number of bases to check as we only need to check one representative from each equivalence class for lightweight diffusion matrices. The empirical evidence from our investigation says that the bases which are in the equivalence class of the polynomial basis are the recommended choices for constructing lightweight MDS diffusion matrices
PHyCT : Privacy preserving Hybrid Contact Tracing
Ever since COVID-19 started grasping worldâs geographies one by one, countries have been struggling to tackle with this emergency by stretching their healthcare infrastructure beyond the boundary. World is now also trying to find ways to âlive with the virusâ or coping with the ânew normalâ. In this effort, contact tracing is thought to be a vital tool which can quickly
figure out persons that have come into vicinity of an infected person. Some countries have adopted centralized contact tracing in the perception that it is the most effective and easy solution. Centralized contact tracing has been in the centre of debate as it is a potential tool for launching mass surveillance. So objecting to this, decentralized model has been introduced
which gives the control fully to the citizens. However, in decentralized model, the onus is completely on the users to act accordingly if they get a risk notification for coming in close contact with a COVID-19 positive patient. Decentralize model will fail if the large mass of users do not act accordingly after receiving the risk notification. Therefore, a balance needs to strike between the centralized and decentralized models given the socio-economic impact of this pandemic.
In this article, we take a hybrid approach and propose PHyCT that guarantees fail-safe, privacy, and security. This system acts like a decentralized one, where identities of users remain anonymous to the central authority. However, if there is a case of infection, the infected user and the central authority can together only reveal the identities of the users who have come in close contact. This feature enables to handle the situation if there are too many non-compliant users who do not report after getting infection exposure notification. Users who have not come into close contact of any infected person remain anonymous
On the Lower Bounds of the Second Order Nonlinearity of some Boolean Functions
The -th order nonlinearity of a Boolean function is an important
cryptographic criterion in analyzing the security of stream as well
as block ciphers. It is also important in coding theory as it is
related to the covering radius of the Reed-Muller code .
In this paper we deduce the lower bounds of the second order nonlinearity
of the two classes of Boolean functions of the form
\begin{enumerate}
\item
with
and where .
\item
where and
is an integer such that , .
\end{enumerate}
For some , the first class gives bent functions whereas
Boolean functions of the second class are all bent, i.e., they achieve
optimum first order nonlinearity
On the lower bound of cost of MDS matrices
Ever since lightweight cryptography emerged as one of the trending topics in symmetric key cryptography, optimizing the implementation cost of MDS matrices has been in the center of attention. In this direction, various metrics like d-XOR, s-XOR and g-XOR have been proposed to mimic the hardware cost. Consequently, efforts also have been made to search for the optimal MDS matrices for dimensions relevant to cryptographic applications according to these metrics. However, finding the optimal MDS matrix in terms of hardware cost still remains an unsolved problem. In this paper, we settle the question of the optimal 4 x 4 MDS matrices over GL(n, F2) under the recently proposed metric sequential XOR count based on words (sw-XOR). We prove that the sw-XOR of such matrices is at least 8n + 3, and the bound is tight as matrices with sw-XOR cost 35 and 67 for the values of n = 4 and 8, respectively, were already known. Moreover, the lower bound for these values of n matches with the known lower bounds according to s-XOR and g-XOR metrics
To Infect Or Not To Infect: A Critical Analysis Of Infective Countermeasures In Fault Attacks
As fault based cryptanalysis is becoming more and more of a practical threat, it is imperative to make efforts to devise suitable countermeasures. In this regard, the so-called ``infective countermeasures\u27\u27 have garnered particular attention from the community due to its ability in inhibiting differential fault attacks without explicitly detecting the fault. We observe that despite being adopted over a decade ago, a systematic study of infective countermeasures is missing from the literature. Moreover, there seems to be a lack of proper security analysis of the schemes proposed, as quite a few of them have been broken promptly. Our first contribution comes in the form of a generalization of infective schemes which aids us with a better insight into the vulnerabilities, scopes for cost reduction and possible improvements. This way, we are able to propose lightweight alternatives of two existing schemes. Further we analyze shortcomings of LatinCrypt\u2712 and CHES\u2714 schemes and propose a simple patch for the former
On the Design of Bit Permutation Based Ciphers - The Interplay Among S-box, Bit Permutation and Key-addition
Bit permutation based block ciphers, like PRESENT and GIFT, are well-known for their extreme lightweightness in hardware implementation. However, designing such ciphers comes with one major challenge - to ensure strong cryptographic properties simply depending on the combination of three components, namely S-box, a bit permutation and a key addition function. Having a wrong combination of components could lead to weaknesses. In this article, we studied the interaction between these components, improved the theoretical security bound of GIFT and highlighted the potential pitfalls associated with a bit permutation based primitive design. We also conducted analysis on TRIFLE, a first-round candidate for the NIST lightweight cryptography competition, where our findings influenced the elimination of TRIFLE from second-round of the NIST competition. In particular, we showed that internal state bits of TRIFLE can be partially decrypted for a few rounds even without any knowledge of the key
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